We present a variant of the linear logical framework LLF that avoids the restriction that well-typed forms be in pre-canonical form and adds λ-abstraction at the level of families. We abandon the use of β-conversion as definitional equality in favor of a set of typed definitional equality judgments that include rules for parallel conversion and extensionality. We show type-checking is decidable by giving an algorithm to decide definitional equality for well-typed terms and showing the algorithm is sound and complete. The algorithm and the proof of its correctness are simplified by the fact that they apply only to well-typed terms and may therefore ignore the distinction between intuitionistic and linear hypotheses.
Introduction
Decidability of type-checking and the existence of canonical forms for well-typed terms are arguably the two most important metatheoretic results for a logical framework such as LF [5] . Type-checking is essential because the checking of proofs reduces to type-checking of the terms that represent them; canonical forms are crucial because it is the canonical terms (of certain types) that may be proven via an "adequacy" theorem to be in a meaningful correspondence with propositions and proofs in a logic.
Canonical forms in the LF type theory are β-normal, η-long forms. It therefore seems reasonable to take definitional equality to be βη-conversion, and decide whether two terms are equal by reducing them to βη-normal form and comparing; unfortunately, η-reduction is not as well behaved as β-reduction and so this approach encounters significant problems. The original presentation of LF by Harper, Honsell and Plotkin [5] (hereafter "HHP") avoided the difficulties of η-reduction by using β-conversion as definitional equality even though this destroyed the property that every term is equal to some canonical form.
Felty's Canonical LF [4] is a version of LF where all well-typed objects and families are in canonical form, avoiding all issues of definitional equality. Felty showed that Canonical LF is essentially the same as full LF if typing derivations are restricted to pre-canonical terms (those whose β-normal forms are canonical) with β-conversion as definitional equality. A similar approach was taken by Cervesato and Pfenning for their presentation of the linear logical framework LLF [1] (hereafter "CP"). The typing rules of LLF forced well-formed terms into η-long form, making all well-typed β-normal forms canonical and rendering any η rules for definitional equality unnecessary.
Subsequent to the original definition of LLF, Harper and Pfenning [6, 7] (hereafter, "HP") gave an alternate formulation of ordinary LF that allowed a clean treatment of definitional equality without having to restrict terms to pre-canonical form. Their approach was based on the use of a typed definitional equality judgment as opposed to an untyped reduction relation-that is, they focused on comparing two objects at a certain type and in a certain typing context, rather than βη-normalizing them in isolation. The decidability of type-checking and the existence of canonical forms for well-typed terms were then established by giving a set of algorithmic judgments that are sound and complete with respect to definitional equality and can be instrumented to extract canonical forms from the terms they compare. The algorithm is similar to one introduced by Coquand [2] , except that Coquand's algorithm performs η-expansion based on the shapes of terms, while HP's is directed by types and kinds. The type-directed nature of the algorithm has the advantage of making it scalable to theories such as LLF that contain unit types. Apart from the typed, declarative formulation of definitional equality, the LF type theory considered by HP was essentially the same as that of HHP, except that the λ-abstraction construct at the level of type families had to be removed for technical reasons. This was not considered a problem, as experience with LF had shown that this form of abstraction was not needed in practice.
In this paper, we present a variant of LLF that employs a typed formulation of definitional equality in the style of HP and extend HP's equality algorithm to handle the linear constructs of LLF. We also resolve the technical issues that necessitated the removal of the family-level λ-abstraction, and so we are able to give a variant of LLF that includes abstraction at the family level even though CP's LLF did not have this feature. This result has been applied by the authors to establish the decidability of typing in the LTT type theory for certified code [3] , and has been extended by Polakow for the Ordered Linear Logical Framework [9] .
Overview
The structure of this report is as follows. In Section 2 we present our variant of the Linear LF type theory, which will essentially be an extension of HP's formulation of LF with linear implication, additive conjunction and additive truth. We will also add a family-level λ-abstraction construct similar to the one that appeared in HHP. Our presentation of the theory will include the typed definitional equality rules we are using to replace the untyped conversion relation of CP. Section 3 will establish some elementary properties of the typing and definitional equality judgments, most notably the regularity, inversion and functionality lemmas that will play a major role in the rest of our discussion of the theory. Another property of the system, which we call injectivity, will be proved in Section 4. HP proved their analogue of injectivity by straightforward
Typing Rules
Signatures and Contexts ( S sig, Γ context, Γ ∆ context) In LF and LLF, the types and kinds of constants are given by a signature. It is by the choice of signature that the logical framework is instantiated to represent a particular logic. For simplicity, in the bulk of this paper we will tacitly assume a fixed signature S; the exception is in the well-formedness rules for signatures, where we use a subscripted turnstile ( S ) to indicate that certain premises are to be understood with respect to the signature mentioned in the conclusion.
The validity judgment for linear contexts specifies an intuitionistic context giving types to all the free variables that may occur in the linear assumptions.
The restriction that linear assumptions not appear in types or kinds is enforced by using only an intuitionistic context for kind and family judgments, and forcing the linear context in which an object is typed for dependent application to be empty. 
Definitional Equality Rules
The definitional equality rules include compatibility rules for all the syntactic constructs of the calculus, as well as parallel conversion rules and extensionality rules for each of the type and kind constructors of the theory. Symmetry and transitivity of equality are explicitly included as rules; reflexivity is shown to be admissible.
Substitutions
In our logical relations proofs, we will make use of the concept of a substitution: that is, a finite mapping from variables (u) to object terms (M ). As a matter of notation, we will use the letter γ to stand for a substitution if we intend that all variables appearing free in γ(u) be intuitionistic, rather than linear. We will call such a substitution an intuitionistic substitution; for substitutions that may produce free linear variables we will use the letter σ.
If Γ is a context, then we will denote by id Γ the identity substitution on Dom(Γ). If σ is a substitution, then σ[u → M ] will denote the substitution that maps u to M and maps v to σ(v) for v = u.
If O is a kind, family or object term, then σO will denote the result of replacing every free occurrence of every variable u ∈ Dom(σ) in O by σ(u). These replacements are performed simultaneously, and bound variables are implicitly renamed to avoid capture. Note that variables not in Dom(σ) are left unchanged by this operation.
For intuitionistic substitutions, we lift the well-formedness and equality judgments on objects in the usual way, enforcing the non-occurrence of linear variables by keeping the linear context empty. Specifically, we define:
1. Γ γ : Γ iff Dom(γ) = Dom(Γ) and for every u ∈ Dom(Γ), Γ ; γ(u) : γ(Γ(u)).
2. Γ γ 1 = γ 2 : Γ iff Dom(γ 1 ) = Dom(γ 2 ) = Dom(Γ) and for every u ∈ Dom(Γ), Γ ;
Using the typing rule for variables, we get Γ id Γ : Γ for any context Γ. We can also prove the following lemma, which states that application of a substitution commutes with a single-point substitution on a variable not in its domain.
Lemma 1 (Independent Substitutions Commute)
If Dom(σ) ⊆ S and u / ∈ S and F V (M ) ⊆ S, and F V (O) ⊆ S ∪ {u} (where O is a kind, family or object term), then:
Proof: Structural induction on O.
Elementary Properties
Lemma 2 (Weakening of Intuitionistic Contexts) Let J be any judgment.
Lemma 3 (Reflexivity)
HP prove a simple substitution lemma, which allows a single well-typed term to be substituted for a variable in the derivation of any judgment, and a simple functionality lemma which allows a single term to be substituted into each side of an equality judgment. Since our proof of injectivity makes heavy use of simultaneous substitutions of the form defined in Section 2.3, we will need more general substitution and functionality lemmas. These may be proved using the single-point versions, or they may be proved directly by induction on derivations. We have chosen the latter approach, and prove the single-point substitution and functionality lemmas as special cases.
Lemma 4 (Free Variables)
Proof: Trivial induction over derivations.
Lemma 5 (Extending Substitutions)
Proof: Direct, using the definition of well-formed and equal subsitutions. The proof requires Weakening (Lemma 2).
Lemma 6 (Intuitionistic Substitution)
2. If Γ; ∆ J and Dom(Γ) ∩ Dom(∆) = ∅ and Γ γ : Γ, then Γ ; γ∆ γJ.
Proof: By induction on derivations, using the preceding lemmas.
Corollary 1 (One-Point Intuitionistic Substitution) Suppose Γ, u:A, Γ context and Γ; M : A. M : A and Γ; N : A.
Proof: Direct, from the preceding lemma.
Lemma 9 (Inversion on Simple Types and Kinds) 
If
Proof: Straightforward, by induction on typing derivations.
We will also state here an inversion lemma for kind equality judgments. HP's equality inversion included families as well as kinds, but that version of the lemma does not hold in the presence of family-level λ-abstraction. Fortunately, HP's only use of equality inversion was in proving their Injectivity of Products lemma; we are going to prove injectivity separately, so we have no need for equality inversion on families at this stage.
Lemma 14 (Equality Inversion for Kinds)
Proof: Straightforward by induction on derivations, since there are no parallel conversion or extensionality rules for kinds.
Injectivity
The goal of this section is to prove a theorem that generalizes the "Injectivity of Products" lemma used by HP in the proofs of subject reduction and soundness of algorithmic equality. For Linear LF we must extend the idea of that lemma to all of the simple type constructors and so we will call it simply "injectivity." Injectivity states that if two families formed using the same connective are definitionally equal, then corresponding subterms of those families will be equal as well. For example, if Γ A 1 B 1 = A 2 B 2 : Type then, according to injectivity, Γ A 1 = A 2 : Type and Γ B 1 = B 2 : Type. (In other words, the mapping from pairs of families to families embodied by each connective is one-to-one up to definitional equality.) HP are able to prove injectivity by means of an inversion lemma which is in turn proved by induction on derivations, but this is not possible in the presence of family-level λ-abstraction. The difficult case to prove by induction is transitivity: even if A and B have the same primary connective, if they are judged equal by virtue of their both being equal to C, then C may not have that same primary connective, rendering the induction hypothesis useless.
Fortunately, the only way this can happen is if one of the parallel conversion rules is used in the derivations of A = C and C = B. This suggests that the appropriate strengthening of the induction hypothesis should apply not only to families with the same primary connective, but also to families that can be converted to ones with the same primary connective. We can state such a hypothesis in the form of a logical relation: we will define a relation on families that implies the injectivity property at base kind and extend it to higher kinds in the usual way. It will then be possible to prove that definitionally equal terms are related under this relation, and we will use this fact to prove the injectivity theorem.
To show that equal terms are related, we must strengthen the induction hypothesis once again, proving instead their images under equal substitutions are related. To do this we will make use of several properties of substitutions, and so before proving the main theorem of the section we will spend some time establishing our terminology for substitutions and the properties of them that we need.
A Logical Relation
In defining this logical relation, and later the equality algorithm, we will use the following definition of the weak head reduction relation wh −→:
The reflexive, transitive closure of wh −→ will be denoted wh −→ * . It will be important that weak head reduction is deterministic.
Lemma 15 (Determinacy of Weak Head Reduction)
Proof: By induction on weak head reduction derivations. Now we can define the logical relation we will use to prove injectivity. Intuitively, we want the relation at base kind to imply the injectivity property we are aiming for. We strengthen this definition and require that the injectivity hold for all possible weak head contracta of the two families in question. Thus we will effectively prove that any family that is definitionally equal to, say, a -family will weak head reduce to one with definitionally equal domain and codomain. This rescues the problematic transitivity case by removing the sensitivity to the exact structure of the terms being compared. Our logical relation is defined as follows:
Type iff all of the following hold:
•
Type and Γ, u:
Type.
Type and Γ C 1 = C 2 : Type.
The construction of this logical relation is unusual in that in the function case, the arguments are required to be definitionally equal, rather than logically equivalent. Also, there is no need to extend the context in the function case as in the Kripke logical relation we will use later to prove the completeness of our algorithm. This turns out to be sufficient (because the terms on which a family depends cannot affect the shape of its weak head normal form), and simplifies the proof considerably.
Note also that the definition does not require that families be definitionally equal to be related at base kind. That's not necessary, and might make closure under head expansion tricky to prove.
Definitionally Equal Terms are Logically Related
Several lemmas are required in order to show that all definitionally equal terms are related by the logical relation we have defined. For the most part, the proofs of these lemmas are independent of one another, and each one is relevant to a few particular cases in the main structural induction proof at the end of this subsection.
The first lemma will allow us to conclude that any family-level constant is logically related to itself.
Proof: By induction on the number of Π's in K.
. But K has fewer Π's in it than K, so this follows by the induction hypothesis.
We need the logical relations to be closed under head expansion in order to show that families proven equal by the parallel conversion rule are logically related. This fact is also used in the case for the congruence rule on λ-abstractions. 
The next lemma, which allows equal substitutions to be extended to map a new variable to equal terms, will be required for some of the later lemmas leading up to the main lemma of this section, as well as for the main lemma itself.
Lemma 18
The next thing we need to establish is that the logical relation on families is symmetric. (Symmetry of the relation on kinds is obvious.) To overcome the asymmetry in the way substitutions are applied to kinds in the definition of the relation, we first prove the following lemma which states that performing equal substitutions on a kind will produce results that are logically related.
Lemma
Proof: By induction on the derivation of Γ K : kind.
Case: Γ K : kind because K = Type. Then γ 1 K = γ 2 K, so the lemma trivially holds.
Case: Γ K : kind because K = Πx:C.K , Γ C : Type and Γ, x:C K : kind.
WLOG, we may assume x / ∈ Dom(Γ), Dom(Γ ), so Γ, x:C context. Suppose that Γ ;
. By Lemma 8, Γ γ 2 C = γ 1 C : Type, since equality of substitutions is symmetric. By the type conversion rule, Γ ;
By symmetry and transitivity, Γ ;
, which is what we needed. Now we can prove that the logical relation is symmetric. Case: K = Type. There are several things to show. We will show the parts concerning reduction to Π-families; the others are similar. 
Now we can prove that all definitionally equal families and kinds are logically related under equal substitutions. Since identity substitutions are equal to themselves, this implies that definitionally equal families and kinds are logically related. The injectivity property follows easily.
Lemma 22 (Definitionally Equal Terms are Logically Related under Subsitutions)
Proof: By induction on derivations.
Case:
Γ a = a : K (S(a) = K)
Since S is well-formed, K is closed. By Lemma 16, Γ a ≈ a : K. Since a and K are closed, Γ γ 1 a ≈ γ 2 a : γ 1 K.
Case: Γ = : Type
Note that γ i = and γ i Type = Type. Also, cannot weak-head reduce to anything but itself. Thus by definition, Γ γ 1 ≈ γ 2 : γ 1 Type.
Case:
Observe that both of these trivially reduce to Π-families, and that neither will ever reduce to a -or &-family. Also, neither may reduce to any Π-family but itself; that is, if Πu: Case:
Type. Observe that both of these trivially reduce to a -family, and that neither will ever reduce to a Π-or &-family. In fact, neither may reduce to any family but itself; thus, if
So, we must show that Γ γ 1 A 1 = γ 2 A 2 : Type and Γ γ 1 B 1 = γ 2 B 2 : Type. This follows by Lemma 11.
Case:
Similar to the previous case.
Using various lemmas, Γ γ 1 = γ 1 : Γ. By the i.h., Γ γ 1
Theorem 1 (Injectivity) Proof: Direct, using Lemma 22 and the definition of ≈.
5 Equality Algorithm
Erasure
To avoid serious difficulties with dependencies on terms, the algorithm and Kripke logical relation presented by HP use simple types and simple kinds in place of ordinary families and kinds. Not only are the typedirected phase of HP's algorithm directed by simple types and the Kripke logical relation indexed by simple types and kinds, but the contexts (or "worlds") in both the algorithmic judgments and the logical relation give only simple types to variables. The process of erasing ordinary families and kinds into simple ones effectively identifies types that differ only in the terms that appear in them. We adopt this practice of erasure as well, extending it to erase the distinction between intuitionistic and linear assumptions in a context. The need for this arises because of the splitting of the linear context that occurs in the typing and definitional equality rules for linear function applications. If this context-splitting were to be enforced in the algorithmic judgments, then the transitivity proof for those judgments would be upset by the possibility that different derivations mentioning the same linear application term might split the context differently.
Essentially, we want to avoid this problem by not requiring the algorithmic equality rule for linear applications to split the linear context. Such a change by itself would destroy the property that every linear assumption in a judgment must be used, so we also have to remove the restriction on linear variable use. However, this leaves us with two separate contexts that are treated in exactly the same way, so we go a step further and combine the intuitionistic and linear contexts into one. Consequently there is no distinction between intuitionistic and linear assumptions in the algorithm or logical relation. This does not affect soundness, since we only wish to prove the algorithm sound for well-typed terms, which must respect linearity.
Grammar for Simple Kinds, Types and Contexts
Our grammar for families and kinds with no term dependencies, and contexts that combine intuitionistic and linear assumptions, is as follows. 
Simple Kinds
κ ::= t − | τ → κ Simple Types τ ::= α | τ 1 → τ 2 | τ 1 τ 2 | τ 1 & τ 2 | Simple Contexts Σ ::= | Σ, u:τ Σ M 1 ⇐⇒ M 2 : τ Type-Directed Object Equality Σ M 1 ←→ M 2 : τ Structural Object Equality Σ A 1 ⇐⇒ A 2 : κ Kind-Directed Family Equality Σ A 1 ←→ A 2 : κ Structural Family Equality Σ K 1 ←→ K 2 : kind
Erasing Kinds, Types and Contexts
The erasure function (·)
− maps ordinary families, kinds and contexts to simple ones.
To validate our intuition that erasure should remove all dependencies on terms, we prove the following lemma which states that substitutions into a family do not affect its erasure. Proof: By structural induction on A.
Another useful feature of erasure is that definitionally equal families and kinds have identical erasures.
Lemma 24 (Erasure Preservation: Equality)
Proof: By induction on the equality derivation.
The Equality Algorithm
Our algorithmic equality judgment forms are shown in Figure 1 . For objects and families we give both classifier-directed rules (that is, type-directed rules for comparing objects and kind-directed rules for comparing families) and structural rules. The classifier-directed rules apply extensionality until a base classifier is reached, then reduce to weak head normal form and compare structurally. The structural rules compare the constant, variable or primitive head and revert to the classifier-directed phase of the algorithm for any other subterms. Since there are no classifiers for kinds (or, put another way, every kind is of the same sort), we only need structural rules to compare kinds. Intuitively, the classifier-directed portion of the algorithm takes a context, two terms, and a classifier and attempts to derive the corresponding algorithmic equality judgment, returning either success or failure; the structural portion takes a context and two terms in weak-head normal form and attempts to synthesize a simple type or kind for which the structural equality judgment is derivable, returning that classifier if it exists.
Notice that the algorithm ignores all issues of linearity. There is no distinction between intuitionistic and linear assumptions-the algorithm does not enforce any restrictions on the number of times something may be used-and the structural rule for linear applications does not split the context. Later, we will see that in the soundness proof, all the necessary information about allocation of linear assumptions is extracted from the typing derivations rather than the derivations of algorithmic equality.
Type-Directed Object Equality
(Σ M 1 ⇐⇒ M 2 : τ ) M wh −→ M Σ M ⇐⇒ N : α Σ M ⇐⇒ N : α N wh −→ N Σ M ⇐⇒ N : α Σ M ⇐⇒ N : α Σ M ←→ N : α Σ M ⇐⇒ N : α Σ, u:τ 1 M u ⇐⇒ N u : τ 2 Σ M ⇐⇒ N : τ 1 → τ 2 Σ, u:τ 1 Mˆu ⇐⇒ Nˆu : τ 2 Σ M ⇐⇒ N : τ 1 τ 2 Σ M ⇐⇒ N : Σ π 1 M ⇐⇒ π 1 N : τ 1 Σ π 2 M ⇐⇒ π 2 N : τ 2 Σ M ⇐⇒ N : τ 1 & τ 2 Structural Object Equality (Σ M 1 ←→ M 2 : τ ) Σ u ←→ u : τ (Σ(u) = τ ) Σ c ←→ c : A − (S(c) = A) Σ M 1 ←→ M 2 : τ 1 & τ 2 Σ π i M 1 ←→ π i M 2 : τ i Σ M 1 ←→ M 2 : τ 2 → τ 1 Σ N 1 ⇐⇒ N 2 : τ 2 Σ M 1 N 1 ←→ M 2 N 2 : τ 1 Σ M 1 ←→ M 2 : τ 2 τ 1 Σ N 1 ⇐⇒ N 2 : τ 2 Σ M 1ˆN1 ←→ M 2ˆN2 : τ 1 Kind-Directed Family Equality (Σ A 1 ⇐⇒ A 2 : κ) A wh −→ A Σ A ⇐⇒ B : t − Σ A ⇐⇒ B : t − B wh −→ B Σ A ⇐⇒ B : t − Σ A ⇐⇒ B : t − Σ A ←→ B : t − Σ A ⇐⇒ B : t − Σ, u:τ A u ⇐⇒ B u : κ Σ A ⇐⇒ B : τ → κ Structural Family Equality (Σ A 1 ←→ A 2 : κ) Σ a ←→ a : K − (S(a) = K) Σ A 1 ⇐⇒ A 2 : t − Σ B 1 ⇐⇒ B 2 : t − Σ A 1 B 1 ←→ A 2 B 2 : t − Σ A 1 ←→ A 2 : τ → κ Σ M 1 ⇐⇒ M 2 : τ Σ A 1 M 1 ←→ A 2 M 2 : κ Σ A 1 ⇐⇒ A 2 : t − Σ B 1 ⇐⇒ B 2 : t − Σ A 1 & B 1 ←→ A 2 & B 2 : t − Σ A 1 ⇐⇒ A 2 : t − Σ, u:A − 1 B 1 ⇐⇒ B 2 : t − Σ Πu:A 1 .B 1 ←→ Πu:A 2 .B 2 : t − Σ ←→ : t − Structural Kind Equality (Σ K 1 ←→ K 2 : kind − ) Σ t − ←→ t − : kind − Σ A 1 ⇐⇒ A 2 : t − Σ, u:A − 1 K 1 ←→ K 2 : kind − Σ Πu:A 1 .K 1 ←→ Πu:A 2 .K 2 : kind −
Some Properties of Algorithmic Equality
There are some elementary properties of the algorithmic equality judgments that may be proved immediately. We begin with weakening, which is easy to prove for the algorithmic judgments since they do not pay attention to linearity.
Lemma 25 (Weakening for Algorithmic Equality) Let J be any algorithmic equality judgment. If Σ, Σ J then Σ, u:τ, Σ J.
Proof: Straightforward, by induction on derivations.
The division of the algorithm into classifier-directed and structural rules constrains the structure of algorithmic equality derivations in a useful way. In particular, only weak head normal forms can be equated by the structural rules, and the context and terms in the structural judgments uniquely determine the classifier. These properties are formalized in the following lemma, which we call Determinacy because it essentially guarantees that no non-deterministic choices need ever be made in a bottom-up search for algorithmic equality derivations. For that reason, the lemma will play a role in proving decidability of equality, but we need it first to establish transitivity.
Lemma 26 (Determinacy of Algorithmic Equality) In order to prove the algorithmic equality relation is symmetric, we need another erasure preservation result in addition to Lemmas 23 and 24: the following lemma states that algorithmically equal families have the same erasure. Later, this will appear to be a trivial consequence of soundness and Lemma 24, but it is not difficult to prove directly. With this lemma established, the proof of symmetry is not complicated. The transitivity proof requires careful case analysis on the two derivations, using determinacy to rule out some cases that are impossible.
Lemma 27 (Erasure Preservation: Algorithmic Equality)
Proof: By induction on the given derivation.
Lemma 28 (Symmetry of Algorithmic Equality)
Proof: By induction on the given derivations. The proof is entirely straightforward, except that Lemma 27 is required for the cases of structural comparison of dependent products. The case for product kinds is similar to that for product families, so we will only show the latter.
By the i.h. on the first subderivation, Σ A 2 ⇐⇒ A 1 : t − . By the i.h. on the second subderivation, Σ, u:A
Lemma 29 (Transitivity of Algorithmic Equality)
Proof: By simultaneous induction on the two given derivations, using determinacy (Lemmas 15 and 26). We will show several cases; the others are all straightforward.
Case: The first derivation ends with
By the same rule, Σ M ⇐⇒ O : α.
Case: The second derivation ends with 
This case is impossible by Lemma 26, part (1) . The symmetric case is impossible by part (2) of the same lemma.
By Lemmas 28 and 26, τ 2 = τ 3 .
By Lemmas 28 and 26, τ 2 = τ 2 . By the i.h., Σ M ←→ O :
Case: The first derivation ends with Case:
By Lemmas 28 and 26, τ = τ .
Case: 
Soundness of Algorithmic Equality
In this section we will prove the soundness result for our algorithm; essentially, we want to show that if two terms are algorithmically equal then they are definitionally equal. It is clear, however, that this can only be true for well-typed terms. (Consider the type-directed rule at type !) Our soundness theorem will therefore have to require that typing derivations exist for the terms being compared. Since our algorithm does not enforce the linearity restrictions present in the definitional equality rules, the proof must also rely on the typing derivations to determine how linear contexts should be split among premises when dealing with linear function applications.
This can pose some difficulty if the two typing derivations disagree on how the context should be split. This can't be avoided, as equal terms may sometimes use their resources differently if unit expressions are involved. For example, in the context ∆ = u: , v: , w:
A, the terms (wˆ )ˆu and (wˆ )ˆv are equal, but there is no linear context in which u and v may be simultaneously well-typed, let alone equal.
To solve this problem, we follow a suggestion proposed by Pfenning [8] . The key is to observe that the way to prove those two problematic applications equal is to use the fact that any variable of type is equal to . Using this extensionality rule and congruence rules, we prove that both of the above terms are equal to (wˆ )ˆ ; thus by transitivity they are equal to each other. But changing an expression of type into is just η-expansion, and HP showed that the type-directed algorithm can be instrumented to find η-long forms. Therefore, the soundness proof should, rather than directly proving the algorithmically equal terms to be definitionally equal, extract a mediating term and prove that it is definitionally equal to both. Comparison with HP's discussion of pseudo-canonical forms strongly suggests that in the classifier-directed cases of the proof, this mediating term will be canonical except for the type labels on λ-abstractions, but we will not prove this.
Before we tackle the main soundness theorem, we must prove a subject reduction lemma. We have expressed this property a little differently from HP, but Regularity (Lemma 10) ensures these two formulations are equivalent provided all the contexts involved are valid. Proof: By induction on weak head reduction derivations. Injectivity (Theorem 1) is required in the cases for the β-reduction axioms for projections and applications. We will show a few representative cases; the rest are analogous.
Now we can prove the main lemma of this section, which will imply soundness of the algorithm. Given two terms that are well-formed and algorithmically equal, the proof constructs a term that is definitionally equal to each of them. Decisions about how the linear context should be split in the definitional equality derivations are made based on the given typing derivations, and since two separate equality derivations are being constructed, there is no need to attempt to resolve differences between the two typing derivations. Soundness of algorithmic equality follows directly from this lemma, using transitivity. Case:
Thus by rules, Γ; ∆ 1 π i M : A i and Γ; ∆ 2 π i N : A i , for i = 1, 2. By the i.h., there exist P 1 , P 2 such that Γ; ∆ 1 P 1 = π 1 M : A 1 and Γ; ∆ 2 P 1 = π 1 N : A 1 and Γ; ∆ 1 P 2 = π 2 M : A 2 and Γ; ∆ 2 P 2 = π 2 N : A 2 . By parallel conversion, Γ; ∆ 1 π i P 1 , P 2 = π i M : A 1 and Γ; ∆ 2 π i P 1 , P 2 = π i N : A 2 . By extensionality, Γ; ∆ 1
Case: Case: Case: Case: 
Definitionally Equal Terms are Logically Related
It takes a little more work to prove the next part of completeness, namely that any two terms that are definitionally equal will be related by our Kripke logical relation. As with the logical relation used to prove injectivity, we must prove symmetry, transitivity and closure under head expansion before tackling the proof by induction on definitional equality derivations.
Lemma 34 (Closure under Head Expansion) Similar to the previous case.
Case:
Γ; ∆ M 1 = M 2 :
